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1999 Sparer Conference Keynote Address:
The Link Between Welfare Reform
and the Labor Market
F r a n c i s F o x P i v e n a
I'm very glad to be here. Ed Sparer was my friend and I want
to join in honoring him. And I'm also glad for a chance to talk
about welfare policy, and its implications for social justice in our
society.
The press touts welfare reform as a great success because the
rolls are down from their peak, by 44%.' Why is that a cause for
celebration? Because the main argument in the campaign against
welfare is that a too-liberal welfare system has had perverse effects
on the personal morality of the women and children who receive
welfare. Those presumed effects include lax sexual and
childbearing behavior; the idea that women spawn babies to get
on welfare, and thatwhen welfare is available, the men who father
those babies can easily walk away. Even more important, a
too-liberal welfare system was said to make it possible for women
to drop out of the labor force. Those charges, which became more
and more heated as the campaign against welfare went on,
sparked a kind of national revival movement to restore moral
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compulsion to the lives of poor women.
Politicians and the press now celebrate the big reductions in
the welfare rolls in ways that keep the revival movement alive.
Think of the press accounts of particular women, the stories about
a Cheri, or an Opal, or a Denise, each of them tales aboutwomen
who were kicked off welfare and, as a result, somehow pulled
themselves together, found a job, put a life together for themselves
and now are smiling and successful, their children proud, and so
on.
Liberals inclined to defend poor women and their right to
welfare have been in disarray. True, there have been efforts to
answer charges about the perverse effects of welfare. One answer
is simply that most women who apply for welfare don't stay on
very long. True enough. Another answer is that most women who
are on welfare are not the teenage moms evoked by all of the sex
talk. And that also is true? Nevertheless, these are weak answers,
weakly offered. Liberals are enfeebled I think because they also
are distressed aboutthe moral implications of too generous welfare
state. In particular, liberals are uncomfortable with the possibility
that if welfare is too easy, too generous, some people will not
work.
The American Left has a great infatuation with wage work, an
infatuation probably equally informed by Calvin and Marx. The
Left regards wage work as the road to a kind of salvation, to the
realization of human creativity and the development of solidarities,
for example. On the other side, there was welfare, and the Left
worried, not without reason, about the sort of life one could live
on welfare, especially considering the low benefits and the
constant insult that accompanies the status of the welfare recipient.
So, troubled by their longstanding romance with wage work,
and by their justifiable dislike of welfare, the Left defense of the
AFDC system against the forces that were seeking to dismantle it
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was weak. But caught up in this dilemma, not enough people
wondered what sort of reform is welfare reform? Does it remedy
the presumably pernicious aspects of welfare? Time has passed,
and we now can begin to look at the impact of reform on the
demoralizing aspects of the old welfare system, and its impact on
wage work as well.
What the Left Overlooked:
the Link Between Social Welfare
and the Labor Market
Under welfare reform, the rolls are down, to be sure. But ifs
no trick to cut the rolls; simply refusing aid does that. Reducing
poverty is another matter.4 Welfare reform has not brought us
reductions in child poverty, despite the fact that unemployment is
at a historical low. 5 In Wisconsin, the flagship of welfare reform,
two out of three people who were cut off welfare are worse off
economically than they were when they were on welfare.' South
Carolina is one of the few states that has instituted a fairly careful
method of tracking what happens to the people cut off the rolls.
Their data indicate that welfare reform has resulted in increased
economic hardship: more people default on their mortgages, on
their utility bills, more people report they cannot get enough to eat
for themselves and their children.
Under welfare reform, the food stamp rolls are going down,
the Medicaid rolls are going down, for the obvious reason that the
application for welfare was the main administrative route to
foodstamps and Medicaid.7 Overall, it appears that about half of
the people that have been cut off welfare are not in fact working?'
In New York 70 percent of the people cut off welfare are not
working.9 And no one really knows what is happening to those
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who did not get jobs.lo We do know that the food pantries and
homeless shelters are deluged with pleas for help that they are
unable to meet. And we know that those that do get jobs earn
very low wages.11
The gist of my argument today is that throughout this
campaign, this national revival movement to restore moral
compulsion to the lives of poor women, we were encouraged to
look at the wrong issues. The American public became pre-
occupied with the morality of the personal choices of poor
women. We were preoccupied with whether women who
confronted very limited and bad alternatives were choosing the
more moral of those alternatives. Was it right for poor mothers to
take welfare? What we should have looked at instead was the
impact of welfare cutbacks on the institutional arrangements that
generate the choices which confront poor women. We should
have focused on the bearing of welfare and welfare reform on
labor markets. There are moral issues here, but they are not
whether it is right or wrong for a woman to apply for welfare so
she can be at home with her children or take care of her sick
husband. Rather, the moral issues have to do with the distribution
of economic well being in our society, as well as the distribution of
opportunity and hope.
If we had focused on these moral issues, and the institutional
arrangements that are implicated in them, we would have viewed
welfare reform quite differently. As it was, welfare reform was
celebrated because it would force poor mothers to work. But by
forcing poor and desperate mothers to compete in the low wage
labor market, the terms offered to low wage workers generally will
deteriorate. Wages and working conditions will be depressed, not
only for the women who are cut off welfare, but for large numbers
of who are already working at low wages.
in fact, I think that welfare cutbacks are part of a broad
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reconfiguration of American social policythat is makingwork more
insecure and depressing wages. Welfare reform is one very
important aspect of this reconfiguration. Underlying this broad
redirection of American social policy is an ancient logic, a logic
that has always governed welfare policy and unemployment
insurance policy, and before that, poor relief policy. The logic was
grasped in 19th century England as the principle of "less eligibility."
The principle argued that no one who lives on relief should be as
well off as the lowest independent laborer. In short, whatever
benefits are available from relief or welfare must ensure that
recipients are worse off than those who are at the very bottom of
the labor market.
Nowadays experts use different language. The principle of
less eligibility is discussed as the tradeoff between welfare and
work. And buried beneath all of talk about the immorality of
people taking welfare instead of working is the tradeoff. If people
are able to survive according to the standards of their community
without working some will not work-especially when the only
kind of work available to them is drudgery, work that earns them
no respect, and that pays very little. In other words, when the
terms of wage work are harsh and degrading, some people will
choose welfare, unless welfare is even harsher and more
degrading.
It also follows from this logic that if we have a welfare system
that supports people at standards judged respectable by their
community, employers won't be able to get workers unless they
offer them something better than welfare. Stated another way,
income protection programs give people a degree of economic
security, a measure of protection from the exigencies of the labor
market. That measure of security means power. It means thatwith
a generous welfare system, workers are better able to bargain with
their employers.
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You can see the logic of the tradeoff in welfare reform. It is the
logic of lifetime limits. No one can get aid from welfare for more
than five years in a lifetime.12 It is the logic of work requirements
while on welfare. In many states an application for welfare now
means an application for a work assignment, for some form of
workfare. In all states, recipients must be assigned to work after
two years. In Mississippi, welfare recipients are being placed in
catfish and chicken processing plants. In Baltimore welfare
recipients are being assigned to housekeeper jobs in hotels. And,
in fact, recipients were used to break a strike at the Omni Harbor
hotel in Baltimore. In Wisconsin, welfare recipients are being
assigned to employers for full forty-hour weeks, and they get only
a welfare check because it is called training. In New York City,
recipients wear orange day-glo vests as they do the work that
unionized public sector workers once did. New York is also trying
to replace welfare centers with "job centers"-a device copied
from Wisconsin. The main innovation in thesejob centers appears
to be something called "diversion," practices which prevent
people from making a formal application for welfare by
intimidating them, or sending them to a food pantry, or simply
making them wait
At the same time, we have increased the harassment that both
applicants and recipients must endure, and this is part of the same
logic. Since we are not making low wage work much better, we
are making welfare much worse, to prevent the tradeoff. We do
this by increasing the stigma of welfare. Finger printing and drug
tests are, after all, rituals of degradation. We increase the
bureaucratic harassment, with multiple investigations, for example.
And then we have greatly elaborated the rules, and expanded the
discretion of welfare staff, to increase the occasions on which
people can be sanctioned, by benefit reductions or outright cutoffs.
Seven states now sanction people by cutting off all family benefits
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after three violations of the rules.13 These violations often occur
when recipients don't understand the notices they receive, or are
late for an appointment. No matter the reason-a sick child, for
example-the infraction justifies the sanction. 4 In some states,
most of the reduction in the rolls has been achieved by the
application of sanctions for rule infractions.
Under these new and harsh conditions, there is no tradeoff at
all for many people. Once a family reaches the time limit, there
is no alternative to low wage work. Once a family is sanctioned,
there is no alternative. And for people being made to dean the
streets in an orange day-glo jacket, the terms of welfare are much
worse than the terms of any work. Under these conditions, poor
women will pour into the labor market and compete forwhatever
work they can find.'" As a result, wages fall. They fall first in the
lower tiers of the labor marketwhere former recipients are directly
competing for work. But the depressing effects on wages radiates
upwards into adjacent tiers of the labor market, as Robert Solow,
economist at Harvard has argued.'"
So let me restate the tradeoff as a law: welfare has a
complementary relationship to the labor market. All else being
equal, a more generous welfare system drives up wages. You can
see this "law" operating everywhere in the world. In countries
where welfare and social assistance are more generous, wages
have not fallen in the 1980s and 90s. In countries where social
assistance is stingy or is being rolled back as it is in Great Britain,
the United States and Japan wages have fallen. You can also see
the law operating within the United States. Before welfare reform,
in states where AFDC benefits were lower, the wages of less
educated women were also lower. And you can also see the law
operating in the historical pattern of welfare expansion and
contraction. In the 1960s, when welfare recipients mobilized in
protests, not only in the welfare centers but in the streets, welfare
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was liberalized, and when welfare was liberalized, wages rose.17
The Broader Shift in
Social Policy
Welfare reform has fastened on the dark side of the tradeoff.
But the logic of the tradeoff also has benign possibilities. It makes
possible a range of reforms that we have not been thinking about.
Neither liberals or conservatives like welfare; they ftink it is
demoralizing for people, and there is some truth to that, given the
demeaning conditions of welfare. But if we want to do something
about those demeaning conditions, to improve the conditions of
poor families, we have to pay attention to the tradeoff. If we
worsen welfare, families will leave the rolls, but those who remain
will fare badly, and so will many more of the working poor. But
if we improve the terms of work, raise wages, make medical
assistance available to people outside of welfare, and provide child
care, the rolls will also shrink. Those people who for whatever
reason remain on welfare won't be worse off, and the working
poor will benefit. The tradeoff can be used for good or for ill.
Moreover, although welfare is symbolically very important, it
is not just welfare that has been "reformed" to take advantage of
the dark side of the tradeoff. Unemployment benefits were also
rolled back. In the 1970s almost 70 percent of the unemployed
got unemployment insurance."8 Underthe Reagan administration,
the formula which made the unemployed in a given state eligible
for longterm benefits was changed, with the consequence that less
than a third of the unemployed got unemployment insurance in
the 1980s.19
Social security has also been rolled back. The age of eligibility
is inching up, and rules are being relaxed to encourage people to
continue working. And of course there is powerful pressure for
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more draconian changes. When social security was initiated in
the 1930s, the major idea was to take older people out of the
labor market because they were competing with younger people
and undermining wages. We have forgotten that idea.
Foodstamps and Medicaid participation is shrinking. The drop
among immigrants is particularly sharp, partially because
immigrants are so susceptible to the chilling effects of welfare
reform rhetoric and welfare reform practices. And, of course, the
minimum wage has been shrinking in real terms. Despite the
recent hike, the minimum is still thirty percent below what it was
in 1968.20
Thus we can see a broad redirection of social policy, away
from income security programs that shored up the bottom of the
labor market by making people more secure, towards work
enforcement. We can see it in the cuts that I have described and
the multiplication of welfare-to-work programs where social
assistance of some kind is only given on the condition that they
work, no matter what kind of work, no matter what they earn, no
matter what respect is due them in that job, no matter their rights.
We can see it in the expansion of tax benefits to employers who
hire welfare recipients and often get the grants. We can see it in
the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit program, which
now costs more than we ever spent on AFDC.21 So this is not just
a matter of saving public money. We can see it in our subsidized
housing programs and some of the Medicaid provisions. Even in
our homeless shelters, work is being made a condition of shelter.2
The Agents of Change
Well, who is doing this? The large impact of these changes on
labor markets and on wages argues that business is an important
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force, hypothetically. And I think it is true that business has
mattered in the politics of welfare reform and social policy reform
more generally.
But business has rarely appeared in the debates over these
policies in its own uniform with its own hat on its head. Instead it
is business-backed think tanks and policy institutes, which are also
multiplying at the state level now that welfare has been turned
over to the states. Public intellectuals, created with business
money, have been very visible and important in the welfare
debate. The Heritage Foundation was the think tank of welfare
reform. These policy institutes and think tanks stimulated a sort of
astroturf movement for welfare reform-a fake grassroots
movement for welfare reform. They regularly flooded
congressional representatives with faxes, filled the press with op
eds, and their people appeared on all the talk shows. They make
sure there is a memo on the desk of every congressperson every
morning. And while both parties get business dollars, in '1980 and
1994, two crucial years in the evolution of these policies, business
money shifted sharply to the Republican party. So, in all of these
ways, business has been very important
But it is also true that there is a lot of popular support for the
attack on welfare. Popular support in the form of the Christian
right, popular support in the form of anti-tax groups, as well as
groups like the National Rifle Association. And I want to say a
few words aboutwhy there is popular support for a reconfiguration
of social policy. I think the public focus on welfare was key to the
cultivation of popular animosity, antagonism, even hatred of social
policies. Even though welfare was a small program, it. has big
cultural meanings. In the campaign against welfare, the images
were of welfare recipients lolling around on the stoop, drinking
beer, making babies. They were somehow to blame for the
economic tribulation of working people whose taxes paid for
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welfare. And these stories were effective. There was a point in
time when the surveys showed that people thought that welfare
was absorbing most of their tax dollars. Welfare recipients were
also to blame for the cultural shocks that people in the United
States have experienced as a result of changing sexual mores, and
changing family mores. The campaign for welfare reform, in other
words, singled out poor women, most of whom were minorities,
as some how to blame for much of what was going wrong in this
country. Invoking all of the old, difficult themes in American
culture-race and sex and poverty-these women on welfare
became a kind of "Other." Welfare practices reinforced that sort
of morality play, that political psychodrama. Welfare practices,
which punish and harass welfare recipients reinforce this
construction of the "Other." This great drama explains why so
many people, including lots of people who are being hurt by
welfare reform because of its depressing effects on the bottom of
the labor market, have joined in the national moral crusade to
discipline poor women.
Meanwhile inequality continues to increase in the United
States. Income is more polarized then it has been at any time
since the census first started collecting data." Welfare reform and
the panoply of policies associated with welfare reform play a role
in this polarization. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
implied as much in the summer of 1997. He explained to
Congress that the United States' economic performance was so
extraordinary, so exceptional, in large part because a heightened
sense of job insecurity had resulted in subdued wage gains.2
Social and fiscal policy, including welfare policy, played an
important role in the development of this insecurity.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Vol. 5 2000 HYBRID 12
Conclusion:
The Need for a Social Movement
One final comment: we are honoring Ed Sparer today and his
ground-breaking work on legal rights for welfare recipients. Ed
Sparer understood that his work on legal rights was made
politically possible and powerful by the 1960s protest movement
of welfare recipients. Even more, he understood that it was
through upheavals from the bottom of our society that all of the
great humanizing efforts in American history have been won. He
understood that itwas through protest among poor people thatthe
welfare system was won in the first place in the 1930s, and that
only as a consequence of protest in the 1960s was that program
expanded, liberalized, and made to obey some of precepts of the
law. I think he would have also understood that it will take a
comparable protest movement to recover some of the social
policies that were won in the past.
Question and
Answer Period
What are the roles of social workers and lawyers in social change?
Piven: I think lawyers and social workers play a very important
role. What are the conditions, after all, that make protest from the
bottom possible? Social scientists puzzle over that question, and
they don't have very specific answers. But one thing I think is
clear, that people don't engage in politics, much less take to the
streets, unless they have hope, unless they think that they can't be
singled out, rounded up, and suppressed, and unless they have
reason to think their protests will resonate with other groups in the
society. The way that advocates of all kinds talk and act can help
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create the supportive contextthat makes protest possible. In 1994,
women's groups and unions opposed welfare reform, but they did
not speak outand make their opposition public. They did nottake
the issue to a public forum. Instead, theywhispered to Clinton and
Leon Panetta, "don't do this. Its not necessary and its nasty." But
whispering did not do any good.
What they had to do was to try to mobilize public opinion. It
might not have worked but it-would have given poor people more
courage because they would have known that there were powerful
allies out there. Why didn't they do it? Beltway organizations
want to maintain their relations in the beltway. They also had a
big stake in getting Clinton re-elected. I believe it was a political
mistake and now we are living with the consequences of that
mistake.
[Question regarding the anticipation of the changes in welfare
policy and the possibility for progressive reform.]
Piven: We did anticipate that this would happen. In the first
edition of Regulating the Poor, published in 1971, we predicted
thatwhen the protests of the 1960s subsided efforts to make relief
programs into work enforcement programs would gain
momentum, and that is just what happened did in 1 970s and 80s.
This did not happen all at once. The changes in the 1996 law in
terms of legal entitlements were dramatic. Butwelfare grant levels
have fallen in lock step with the minimum wage since the mid
1 970s. Then Clinton campaigned on the slogan "two years and off
to work." He wanted to show his credentials as a new Democrat,
as a conservative Democrat-and enraged Republicans because he
was stealing one of their best issues. They weren't going to let him
get away with that. When they took over Congress in 1994, they
showed him what two years and off to work really meant, and he
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signed their bill. The historical pattern seems to me clear: when
poor people are no longer a danger, no longer a threat in
American society, the humanizing reforms that we invent when
they are a threat tend to be rolled back.
Does that sound hopeless that there is no permanent,
enduring reform? Well nothing is permanent You have to keep
fighting, and that is just the way it is.
[Question regarding how the rhetoric of the tradeoff and a work
enforcement relief policy can be used to benefit the poor.]
Piven: The theory is that now thatwelfare recipients have becomes
workers, their moral and cultural standing is enhanced so that they
now can demand rights as workers. That certainly was the hope
in workfare organizing-and is the hope among workfare
organizers: everyone who works is entitled to a living wage,
employment security, and health insurance, etc. It is an organizing
tack, which I don't dismiss. But it is dangerous too if as a result of
a concentration on that tack, which so far has yielded no wins, we
desert welfare recipient themselves. It would be better perhaps to
develop a hiring hall style of organizingwhich included recipients
who were on welfare and those that were on workfare. Work
assignments, after all, can be short lived. Indeed, tracking is
showingthatjobs people get upon leavingwelfare often do not last
very long.
Remember that the low wage labor market is very irregular
and the lives of poor women are very crisis ridden, partly because
they have such irregular daycare. So we need to experiment with
a kind of organizing that reaches people no matter where they are




[Question regarding the connection between welfare reform and
changes in the criminal justice system, such as longer sentences
and the proliferation of prisons.]
Piven: Part of the reaction, the backlash politics of the 1 980s and
90s, led by professional politicians and organized business groups,
was to make appeals to ordinary people in terms of their anxieties.
One kind of anxiety had to do with crime, "the criminal element,"
which was always thought of as constituted by minorities. And
another kind of anxiety had to do with what is happening to
families and what is happening to work. These anxieties attached
themselves quite easily to welfare recipients. Most people don't
seem to see that building prisons and incarcerating so many is not
good for the majority of our population. Rather than going to
public schools and free clinics, public monies are going to build
prisons. These cultural appeals are very powerful and can capture
people who feel themselves in the throes of anxiety-provoking
changes, which are hard to understand and control. So we have
to worry about this cultural politics and the damage it can do to
the minimal social democratic programs that we have in the
United States.
[Question concerning the absence of the importance of education
and the development of social capital in the discussion of welfare
policy.]
Piven: Well it is not because people don't think of it. I teachatthe
City University of New York, which has been a target of budget
cutters for 23 years. Before the 1996 law, we had 14,000 welfare
recipients going to school at CUNY, leaming, for example, to be
health paraprofessionals and paralegals, learning skills from which
they could earn a livingwage. As consequence of welfare reform,
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and the citys implementation of welfare reform, an estimated
13,000 students were forced out of the university system because
they had to meetwork requirements.2 The policies did everything
to make the completion of their education impossible. The 'city
was reluctant to allow them to do their work assignments on
campus, they still had to seek childcare, complete their school
work, and meettheirwork requirements. These welfare recipients
were trying to complete school because they knew full well that if
they did not go to school they would be stuck in a minimum wage
job for the rest of their lives. Contrary to popular belief, there is
not a ladder of occupational mobility when you start with a
minimum wage job. Instead, you end up twenty years later with
a twenty-cent increase in your wages. There is no job ladder for
most people out there without an education and marketable skills.
It is rather a job trap. Because work enforcement and numerical
decreases in the welfare rolls have so consumed the welfare
debate, the importance of education and investment in social
capital as a way of reducing poverty rather than just the rolls has
not been a focus, and this is something that should be changed.
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